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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
prosecute is the same as when he is merely absent
or his office vacant, the rationale supporting the
court's inherent power of appointment is con-
sidered applicable to both situations.
This inherent power of the court has generally
been codified by statutes. The usual statute pro-
vides for the appointment of a special prosecutor
when the regular prosecutor is "absent, sick, dis-
qualified or interested" in the proceeding." How-
ever, the language of such statutes does not ex-
.pressly include the prosecutor's refusal to act as
grounds for the appointment of a special prose-
cutor. Furthermore, it has been held that a court's
power to appoint is limited to the causes specified in
the statute.u On the other hand, some courts have
held that an appointment can be made under the
authority of such statutes when the prosecutor
refuses or fails to act.H Appointments under these
"See, e.g., Amiz. REv. STAT. §11-534 (West 1956)
(absence); ARE. STAT. ANN. §24-117 (1947) (failure to
attend); CAL. ANN. CODES (GOERNMENT) §26542
(West 1954) (deputy in case of vacancy); CON. GEN.
STAT. §7612 (1949) (absent or disqualified); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 29, §2503 (1953) (absence); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§27.16 (district attorney), §32.17 (soliciter) (1941)
(vacancy); GA. CODE ANN. §24-2013 (1933) (disquali-
fied); IDAno CODE ANN. §31-2603 (1948) (absent or
relation); ILL. REv. STAT. c. 14, §6 (1955) (absence,
sickness, interest); IND. ANN. STAT. §49-2505 (1951)
(failure to attend); IowA CODE ANN. §336.3 (1949)(absence, sickness, disability); KAN. GEN. STAT. §10-
715 (1949) (vacancy); LA. REV. STAT. §15:311 (1950)
(interest or absence); ME. REv. STAT. c. 89, §§120, 121(1954) (absent or vacant); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS
art. 10, §41 (1951) (absent or vacant); MicH. STAT.
A-NN. §5.758 (1935) (absent); Miss. CODE ANN. §3924(1942) (absent or disqualified); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§56.110, 56.120 (Vernon 1949) (interested or sickness);
NEB. REv. STAT. §23-;205 (1943) (absence, sickness,
disability); NEv. Comn,. LAws. §2075 (1929) (absent or
disqualified); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §7:33 (1955) (ab-
sent); N.J. REv. STAT. §2:182- 9) (1937) (absent); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §17-1-14 (1953) (intelest); N.Y. CouNTY
LAW §701 (disqualified); N.C. GEN. STAT. §7-43.3(1952) (absence); OnIo REv. CODE §309.04 (1953)
(vacancy, sickness, disability); OKa.A. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, §202 (1956) (absence); ORE. REV. STAT. §8.710
(1955) (absence or interest); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§1404 (1956) (vacancy); S.C. CoNsT. art. 5, §29 (1952)(failure to attend); S.D. ConE §12.1304 (1939) (absence
or interest); TENN. CODE ANN. §8-706 (1955) (absent
or disqualified); TEx. CODE Cnmt. PRoc. ANm. art. 31
(1954) (failure to attend); VT. REv. STAT. §455 (1947)
(assistant to perform in absence); UTAH CODE ANN.
§67-7-11 (1953) (absent or disqualified); VA. CODE
Ai-N. §19-4 (1950) (absence, sickness, interest); WASH.
REv. CODE §36.27.030 (1951) (absence, sickness, inter-
est); Vis. STAT. §59.44 (1955) (absence, sickness,
interest).
m See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Territory, 11 Okla. 213, 66
Pac. 342 (1901) (limited by statute to vacancy, absence,
or inability to attend); State v. Heaton, 21 Wash. 59,
56 Pac. 843 (1899) (limited by statute to failure to
attend).
13 See, e.g., Mizell v. State, 184 Ala. 16, 63 So. 1000
statutes have been made on either of two theories:
that courts are not limited to the enumerated
causes or that the prosecutor's refusal to perform is
equivalent to self-disqualification. The general
acceptance of these theories would considerably
broaden the statutes and make them available
to circumvent a corrupt prosecutor.
A few statutes expressly provide for the ap-
pointment of a special prosecutor when the prose-
cutor fails or refuses to perform. 4 In addition, a
small group of states have enacted statutes which,
while their language is rather vague, might allow
the appointment of a special prosecutor in this
situation.n
Assuming the existence of the statutory or
inherent power of the courts to appoint a special
prosecutor when the prosecutor refuses to act,
there are, nevertheless, several obstacles to se-
curing such an appointment. A special prosecutor
is usually appointed either at the request of the
regular prosecutor when the latter declares himself
disqualified or upon the court's own motion.-H
However, it has been held that a citizen may
petition for such an appointment. 7 Since the
(1913) (whether properly absent or not); Spaulding v.
State, 61 Neb. s89, 85 N.W. 80 (1901) (refusal to
prosecute).
" See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, §235 (1940) (refusal,
absence, interest); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§5-3-4, 5-3-30(1953) (failure, neglect, refusal); N.D. REv. CODE
§11-1606 (1943) (absence.or refusal); OHio REv. CODE
§309.05 (1953) (neglect or misconduct); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 16, §7710 (1956) (refusal); TEEN. CoNsT. art. 6,
§5 (refusal); UTAH CoNsT. art. 8, §10 (refusal).
5 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. §432.210 (1953) (prose-
cutor who takes a bribe or withholds evidence); MrNN.
STAT. §388.12 (1949) (discretion of judge); MONT. REv.
CODE ANN. §16-1126 (1947) (to serve ends of justice);
W. VA. CODE ANN. §404 (1955) (improper in opinion of
court); Wyo. CotP. STAT. ANN. §27-608 (1945) (public
interest requires appointment).
56 See, e.g., People v. Moretti, 415 Ill. 398; 114
N.E.2d 337 (1953); Wilson v. County of Marshall, 257
Ill. App. 220 (1930); State v. Jones, 306 Mo. 437, 268
S.W. 83 (1924).
57 See, e.g., People v. Northup, 184 Ill. App. 638(1914) (to investigate vote frauds during election in
which prosecutor was elected); Lake County Property
Owners Ass'n v. Holovachka, 233 Ind. 509, 120 N.E.2d
263, 121 N.E.2d 721 (1954) (to investigate irregular
activities of prosecutor). It might be advisable to allow
a citizen to engage a private attorney to challenge the
prosecutors failure to act on his complaint. Such
action seems to be contemplated by PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
16, §7710 (1956) which authorizes the court to hear the
complaint and appoint a private counsel if it is a proper
case for prosecution. Such a statute might be effectively
employed by various civic organizations with the desire
and funds to take action where the prosecutor fails. See
also Comment, 65 YALE L. R. 209 (1955), for a discus-
sion of private prosecution as a remedy for the prose-
cutor's failure to act.
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grand jury is composed of private citizens, it
would appear that such a body should be able to
request the appointment of a special prosecutor
if the regular prosecutor refused to prosecute an
indictment. But a private citizen appears to have
no right to demand the appointment of a special
prosecutor or to appeal the court's refusal to
appoint, since such an appointment has been
held to be within the complete discretion of the
trial judge.5 8
Another problem involved in obtaining the
appointment of a special prosecutor is the tendency
of the court to construe their replacement power,
whether statutory or inherent, very narrowly.
5 9
Perhaps one reason for this limitation is the at-
titude of certain judges that active participation
in suppressing organized crime would destroy
their usefulness as impartial judges.6 0 Furthermore,
the courts may be reluctant to question the dis-
cretion of the prosecutor, since the latter has
always been allowed wide discretion in his selection
of crimes or criminals to prosecute." Because of
this discretion, it is difficult to determine when he
has actually failed or refused to perform his
duties. The courts are no doubt correct in pro-
tecting the prosecutor from replacement by a
special prosecutor merely because a citizen dis-
agrees with his direction of a case. However,
m See Lake County Property Owners Association v.
Holovachka, 233 Ind. 509, 120 N.E.2d 263, 121 N.E.2d
721 (1954). The association sought the appointment of
a special prosecutor to investigate certain acts of the
regular prosecuting attorney prior to his election to
office and to initiate prosecutions if any of those acts
were crimes. The court held that such an appointment
must be left to the discretion of the trial judge. They
further held that since the association "had no right of
action to begin with,... (it) could have no right to
appeal."
-9 See, e.g., Gray v. District Court, 42 Colo. 298,
94 Pac. 287 (1908), where the court held partial motives
were not grounds for replacement as long as the prose-
cutor was not corrupt. In Pippin v. State, 34 Tenn. 43
(1854) appointment of a special prosecutor was sought
under a "failure and refusal" statute on the grounds of
the prosecutor's incompetence. The court held in-
competency was not satisfactory grounds under the
statute. In Commnowealth v. Dawson, 3 Pa. Dist.
603 (1894), the court illustrated its reluctance to act by
describing the replacement power as "extraordinary"
and to be used only where "circumstances imperatively
demand."
65 See Senate Special Committee To Investigate
Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, Final Report,
S. REP. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1951), where
Judge Goodenough of Kenton County, Kentucky,
when asked about possible "inspiration" of the grand
jury replied, "Now my conduct, of necessity, must be
restricted. I am a judge, sir."
61 Baker, The Prosecuor-Initiation of Prosecution,
23 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 770 (1933).
the prosecutor is amply protected from excessive
interference by the requirement that a full judicial
hearing be conducted before his disqualification
and replacement.62
Even if an appointment of a special prosecutor
can be obtained, he will have a rather limited
scope of authority. The special prosecutor ap-
pointed under the inherent power of the court is
apparently limited to conducting the proceedings
in a particular case.6 The statutes which allow
appointment when the prosecutor refuses or fails
to act also seem to contemplate a single prosecu-
tion.6 4 Nevertheless, the appointment of a special
prosecutor is not restricted to a case pending before
the court but may be made for the purpose of
investigating the circumstances of a complaint.n
However, there is no express statutory authority
or judicial precedent for the appointment of a
special prosecutor to make a general investigation
of crime in a given area. But the special prosecutor
does have all the powers of the regular prosecutor
for the case at hand, including the ability to
appear before the grand jury.6
The combination of special prosecutor and
grand jury would be a powerful instrument of
law enforcement within a community. The grand
jury's wide investigatory powers could be em-
ployed to discover particular violations requiring
prosecution. If the regular prosecutor refused to
act upon this information, a special prosecutor
could be appointed to conduct the proceedings.
While there are certain difficulties in securing the
6 See, e.g., State ex ret. Spencer v. Criminal Court
214 Ind. 551, 15 N.E.2d 1020, 16 N.E.2d 888 (1938);
State ex rel. Ilvedson v. District Court, 70 N.D. 17,
291 N.W. 620 (1940); Mifflin v. Arnett, 153 Okla., 47,
4 P.2d 732 (1931).
3 See, e.g., Dukes v. State, 11 Ind. 556 (1858)
(appointed "to conduct the prosecution of a criminal");
Territory v. Harding, 6 Mont. 323, 12 Pac. 750 (1887)
(appointed to "prosecute the action. ... for the time
being and for the case at hand"). See also note 50
supra.
6 See, e.g., N.D. Rxv. CODE §11-1606 (1943), which
provides for appointment for "that proceeding" and
grants the special prosecutor the prosecutor's usual
powers "for the purpose of that action." PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 16, §7710 (1956) allows appointment for a "proper
case" and an "entire proceeding."
6- See, e.g., People v. Northrup, 184 Ill. App. 638
(1914); Lake County Property Owners Ass'n v. Holo-
vachka, 233 Ind. 509, 120 N.E.2d 263, 121 N.E.2d
721 (1954); State ex rte. Thomas v. Henderson, 123
Ohio St. 474, 175 N.E. 865 (1931).
66 See, e.g., State v. Miller, 132 Iowa 587, 109 N.W.
1087 (1906) (may go before grand jury to present case
for which he was appointed); State ex rel. Thomas v.
Henderson, 123 Ohio St. 474, 175 N.E. 865 (1931) (may
aid and advise grand jury).
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appointment of a special prosecutor and the scope
of his authority is limited, the convictions he
obtains are relatively safe from collateral attacks
because of a generally accepted defacto doctrine.
Under this doctrine the acts of a special prosecutor
appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction
and performed under color of title are valid against
the attack of both the public and other parties of
interest."
Summary
At the present time both judicial precedent and
a majority of the statutes fail to provide clearly and
adequately for the appointment of a special
prosecutor when the regular prosecutor fails or
refuses to act. However, the courts apparently
have the inherent power to make such an appoint-
ment. But in order to make the appointment of a
special prosecutor generally available, this court
6 See CONSTANTINEAU, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND THE
DEFAcTO DocrmNE §405 (1910).
6 See, e.g., McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596
(1895); United States ex rel. Doss v. Lindsley, 148
F.2d 22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 325 U.S. 858 (1945);
State v. Hays, 127 Conn. 543, 18 A.2d 895 (1941);
Lavin v. Board of Comm'rs, 245 Ill. 496, 92 N.E. 291
(1910).
power should be clarified by statute. Such statutes
should expressly provide that a group of citizens,
and in particular a grand jury, may petition the
court for the appointment of a special prosecutor.
Furthcrmore, the power of appointment should
not be left to the complete discretion of the trial
judge but should be appealable for abuse of this
discretion. In addition, the scope of authority of
the special prosecutor should be broadened by
statute. The court should be authorized to appoint
a special prosecutor to make general investigations
in a certain area and for a given period of time
rather than for a single case only. The increased
availability and authority of the special prosecutor
under such statutes would not interfere with the
authority of the regular prosecutor, since a full
judicial hearing should continue to be necessary
in order to disqualify and replace him.
In some instances, the attorney general, who
need not fear local pressures, can most effectively
supersede a corrupt local prosecutor. In others,
the special prosecutor, because of his knowledge of
local conditions, would be the most effective
replacement for the corrupt prosecutor. For this
reason, both methods of circumvention should be
available.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Private Counsel Can Represent Complaining
Witness in Criminal Proceeding-The defendant
was charged with the crime of assault and battery.
At the trial, the complaining witness was repre-
sented by private counsel, who admitted that he
was in no way connected with the city solicitor's
office, the office prosecuting the charge. Over
objection, the trial judge allowed the private
counsel to be present during the course of the
trial. The Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed the
defendant's conviction and held that there had
been no error in permitting the complaining
witness to be represented by private counsel,
and said that even if it was improper, the error
was not prejudicial to the defendant. State v. Ray,
143 N.E.2d 484 (Ohio, 1957).
The defendant contended that in the prosecution
of a criminal case in a municipal court, the state
may be represented only by the city solicitor of
the municipal corporation, and that private counsel
may not assist the person filing the charges of the
criminal offense. In rejecting the defendant's
contention, the court noted that, historically,
criminal prosecutions at common law were gen-
erally carried on by private individuals interested
in having the accused convicted, and not by a
public official. The court said, however, that
although this practice is now carried on only to a
limited extent in some of the inferior courts of this
country, it could find no statutory or constitu-
tional reason for prohibiting the appearance of
private counsel in present day criminal proceed-
ings, especially in courts of limited jurisdiction.
Moreover, the court stated that "both the public
and individual litigants in such courts are sure to
be mutually benefited by the services rendered by
private counsel." Only if the conduct of private
counsel prevented the defendant from having a
fair trial would there be grounds for reversal, the
court said.
Comment by Attorney to Jury Indicating Per-
sonal Knowledge of Perjury Prejudicial-During a
trial for first degree murder the defendant's wife,
19581
